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IntroductIon
It is generally believed that one sign that the secret services are 
doing their job well is that the media says nothing about them. In 
this respect, Russia is a special case: the services receive an excess 
of media coverage. This is only partly due to the media’s natural 
interest in an attractive subject, as well as the services’ own self-
promotion (although that is increasingly true around the world). 
In fact, it is a symptom of Russia’s information warfare, in which 
the special services’ public image is just one block in building 
the appearance of a strong state and a strong government. It also 
justifies and legitimises the high position which the services and 
elite members of the institutions of force enjoy in the Russian Fed-
eration’s political system. 
However, this artificial, mythologised image of the services con-
flicts with their non-public practices. These are revealed when 
their cover is blown, when journalists investigate criminal scan-
dals involving the services, when controlled and uncontrolled 
leaks of compromising information take place, and when the op-
position publicises cases where the special services violate funda-
mental rights and civil liberties – something they often do under 
the pretext of fighting the ‘fifth column’ of the West, international 
terrorists and foreign spies. This produces two different images 
of the services: the official one and the common one. The former 
presents the services as professional, patriotic and a stronghold 
of traditional values, Russia’s ‘sword and shield’; the latter shows 
them as pampered by the regime, lawless, corrupt and undisci-
plined, involved in brutal competition with one another, bureauc-
ratised and criminalised. 
This text attempts to explain the paradox of the Russian special 
services’ dual public image as reflected in the media. By placing 
this question in the context of information warfare, it intends to 
portray a broader picture of how the services operate domesti-
cally and externally, as well as their strengths and weaknesses. 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
3/
20
19
6
Information warfare itself is discussed only selectively: the 
services’ active role in conducting that kind of warfare, which 
involves obtaining, defending and distorting information, is 
mentioned only briefly; and the text does not address issues con-
cerning cyberspace, even though this is the services’ main theatre 
of operations at present. 
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ExEcutIvE summary
The Russian special services owe their high institutional position 
to their place in the system of government. They are directly sub-
ordinate to the highest, presidential, decision-making centre at 
the strategic level of governance, as are the functions they per-
form in the centralised system of power, such as meeting infor-
mational needs, providing control, security, repression, as well 
as conducting reconnaissance and intelligence. Traditionally the 
special services have also actively participated in Russia’s war 
for predominance in the political, economic, military and infor-
mational spheres. Their official image is an element of the prop-
aganda of ‘strong state and strong leadership’ which prevails in 
Russia. However, when confronted with the actual outcomes of 
their secret activities as they are uncovered, this ideologised and 
mythologised image encounters a certain cognitive dissonance. 
The opinions and judgements about the services seen in generally 
available sources are often mutually contradictory, and incom-
patible with their own declared objectives, values and attitudes. 
The two narratives being promoted, the official one and the com-
mon one, evoke different, and in some cases contradictory images 
of the services. The former highlights their statutory tasks and is 
painted in bright colours, while the latter is dark and emphasises 
their extrajudicial and illegal activities. Both narratives have ac-
cumulated different myths; both have distinct styles (official pa-
thos versus emotionally-charged negative characterisations), and 
both are based on different underlying theories about the secret 
services’ role in the Russian system of power (‘Chekistocracy’ and 
praetorianism vs kleptocracy and ‘corpocratism’).1 While the of-
ficial representation of the services primarily highlights their 
role as guardians of the state and its stability, the common im-
age emphasises their criminality and pliancy (or even servility) 
1 Korpokratura (here rendered as ‘corpocratism’) is a term used by the Rus-
sian opposition to denote the rule of the ‘Chekist’ corporation. It was coined 
as a variant of demokratura (‘democratism’), a word used by Boris Yeltsin’s 
critics to denote his system of power. 
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towards the decision-makers, which trumps respect for the law; 
it also stresses the services’ role as ‘hitmen’ for the ‘assassins’ cor-
poration’ ruling Russia which deals ruthlessly with its opponents.
The generally accessible sources of information about the services 
are broad and diverse. They are used as tools of disinformation 
and propaganda, as well as in the information overload which 
results from that, and they serve several different purposes. For 
this reason, the special services’ prominent presence in the infor-
mation space should be analysed in several dimensions:
 – as support operations for the ruling elite (on the one hand, 
they give the impression that Russia has freedom of speech, 
social justice and is fighting corruption; but on the other, they 
justify the state’s restrictions on civil liberties);
 – as a way to manage public opinion, i.e. distracting public atten-
tion from the problems which are most troublesome to the people 
and which the opposition highlights, but the state cannot solve;
 – as a safeguard for the nexus of politics, force and business that 
underlies Putin’s system of power; 
 – as self-promotion for the services (especially their counter-
intelligence, anti-terror and anti-extremist activities);
 – as distraction and camouflage, designed to divert attention 
from and mislead about the services’ operations; and
 – as a form of immunisation, i.e. a way to strengthen the secu-
rity system’s resilience and cohesion (the information war in-
volves a series of successes and failures for the services, but 
which remain hidden from the public eye).
One cornerstone of the Kremlin’s image policy involves mak-
ing sure that uncontrolled information which presents reality 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
3/
20
19
9
negatively does not overshadow the reality portrayed in official 
narratives. This declared reality pushes the real one to the mar-
gins and makes it irrelevant. As a result, when scandals involving 
the special services are unearthed, their reputation is not affect-
ed, and no crises of confidence in them arise. The public’s trust in 
the special services remains stable in opinion polls; with favour-
able ratings at 55.7%, they rank as one of the top three most trust-
ed institutions, after the army (84.8%) and the Orthodox Church 
(65.7%). Interestingly, the services are still trusted even though 
the public actually knows little about their work.
Moreover, it has long been understood in Russia that effective im-
age management requires not just a long-term strategy, but also 
consistency in implementing it and involving the authorities. So 
the latter help to shape the public’s expectations regarding the 
services, and in repairing their image following the crises caused 
by their widely-publicised scandals.
The opposition also wages its own information war2 against the 
Kremlin, in which the question of the special services is just one 
of several areas of confrontation – but it has to do so on unequal 
terms. The government treats it as a testing ground for ways to 
combat ‘counter-information’. The efforts to disintegrate the op-
position and push it to the margins of society and politics rely on 
reinforcing the distinction of ‘friend or foe’ in the public imagi-
nation. The critics of authoritarian rule are thus represented as 
foreign agents inspired by other countries’ intelligence services, 
and traitors to the homeland, lacking any patriotic feelings, who 
are intent on marginalising Russia. Unsurprisingly, the opposi-
tion media have much more limited opportunities to promote 
2 According to a classic definition, “information warfare is mutual negative 
co-operation, involving at least two entities, pursued in the spheres of infor-
mation acquisition, information distortion and information defence, where 
each action by one side corresponds to an analogous action of the other 
side”. See L. Ciborowski, Walka informacyjna [Information Warfare], Toruń 
1996, p. 9.
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their views than do the Kremlin’s image makers, who have ac-
cess to open and secret, formal and informal channels of indirect 
influence (popular culture including films and TV series, disin-
formation and provocations, copy-paste texts for further circula-
tion, interpretative text messages, and compromising materials to 
smear opponents), as well as instruments of direct influence such 
as leading articles by special service chiefs, press and television 
interviews, information and photo services, and videos circulat-
ed in the media). The government can also use legal and organi-
sational instruments, with which they can tighten control over 
the media and non-governmental organisations, and penalise all 
forms of criticism against the government. All these factors mean 
that their information measures are highly effective domestically.
In Western democracies, with their open societies, media plu-
ralism and absence of censorship (as well as Western empathy 
towards Russia, or more widely, tolerance towards outsiders, 
ignorance of Russian realities, and Western societies’ pacifist atti-
tudes), Russian disinformation has faced few major obstacles un-
til recently. The growing international awareness of the threats 
coming from Russia was cemented by the Skripals’ case,3 which 
eventually forced the West to mount a firm and consolidated reac-
tion against the Kremlin’s growing aggression.
Last year’s events, as well as certain permanent systemic features, 
seem to suggest that the Russian special services cannot support 
the Kremlin elite effectively in the West or improve its image in 
the eyes of Western public opinion. But that does not mean they 
will cease their destructive activities in the information space (in-
cluding cyberspace), which offers the Kremlin convenient instru-
ments to influence the global situation. On the contrary; follow-
ing the GRU’s series of recent blunders, Russia will seek to deploy 
3 This operation, carried out by Russian military intelligence functionaries, 
involved poisoning the former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia on 
British territory. 
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a full range of information warfare forces and methods (both 
defensive and offensive), involving existing and new bodies, in 
order to consolidate and co-ordinate the potential of its services. 
It has the necessary traditions & experience, and the well-trained 
human resources. This also means that the Russian special ser-
vices will retain their status as beneficiaries of the authoritarian 
regime, because their covert operations are of such great impor-
tance in the Kremlin’s programme of information warfare.
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I. War?! but What kInd of War?
The special services’ high position in Russia’s political system has 
received various ideological justifications: in the 1990s the siloviki, 
who were working to get a top position in the political and eco-
nomic system, were represented as a worldly, polyglot elite with 
a good understanding of the market economy. The myth of the 
services’ elite status and exceptionality was then expanded when 
they were represented as a stronghold of patriotic and traditional 
values and the vehicle for a shared worldview (part of which was 
a vision of imperial Russia as a key factor in today’s Russia ris-
ing from its knees). They were also described as performing func-
tions not typically associated with the special services, such as 
modernising the state and acting as the guardians of the nation’s 
spiritual values. Since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s rule, the 
idea of the strong services has been embedded in the metaphor of 
the Chekist ‘hook’ which Russia is hanging from, and which stops 
her from falling off the precipice. That image of the services has 
clearly influenced the image of the new ruling elite, which has its 
roots in the KGB, and which has been legitimised by narratives 
about strong leadership and the dictatorship of law.
Since the annexation of Crimea, the role of the institutions of force 
in governing the country has increased. The Kremlin’s confron-
tational strategy has been justified by a geopolitical vision of the 
world as an arena for the rivalry between the Russian services and 
their Western counterparts who are plotting against Russia. In this 
vision, the Russian special services are in a state of permanent in-
formation war with the West, and must constantly improve their 
defences to gain an advantage in the information sphere. In daily 
practice, this is reflected in a narrative about how strong the Rus-
sian services are, and how weak the enemy states and their services 
are. However, this ‘community of success’ narrative about the Rus-
sian services does not reflect reality, or make the services any more 
transparent or less secretive. The Russian people’s knowledge about 
the services is rather scant: in keeping with Russian legal culture, 
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the security sector is a closed system, and the range of information 
classified as state secrets is substantially broader than the Western 
equivalent. 
At the opposite end are the media outlets run by the so-called 
‘intransigent opposition’ and human rights defenders in Russia,4 
which describe the services as part of the ‘assassins’ corporation’, 
and emphasise that their official pathos and privileged position 
has not really made the ordinary people any safer. For years, these 
groups have been investigating criminal acts involving members 
of the institutions of force (including smear campaigns to discred-
it businesses and opposition members; the fabrication of charges 
and evidence in lawsuits against so-called enemies of the regime; 
the infiltration of the opposition and the internet; the secret kill-
ings of journalists, business competitors and political rivals; and 
fostering pathologies such as organised crime, protectionism, 
corruption and nepotism). Abuses involving functionaries who 
acquire assets illegally have been a constant element in those 
stories. One such case was recently described in Novaya Gazeta, 
which explained the not-overly-sophisticated mechanism where-
by members of the Federal Security Service (FSS)’s leadership ap-
propriated the land of the NKVD kolkhoz near Moscow.5 In this 
case, the special services are just one area of the opposition’s con-
frontation with the Kremlin, especially since new, dramatic ele-
ments of this confrontation have emerged in the wake of Russia’s 
wars in Ukraine and Syria, such as the recently uncovered case of 
the Russian mercenaries from the so-called Wagner group.
The opposition’s information war against the Kremlin is not be-
ing fought on a level playing field. Unsurprisingly, the opposition 
media have far fewer opportunities to promote their views than 
4 See e.g. www.index.org.ru/journal; http://grigoryants.ru; https://fbk.info; 
http://navalny.com 
5 Р. Анин, ‘Дворцы под охраной’, Новая газета, 19 November 2018, https://
www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/11/19/78623-dvortsy-pod-ohranoy
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
3/
20
19
14
the Kremlin’s image makers, who have access to open and secret, 
formal and informal channels of indirect influence (popular cul-
ture including films and TV series, disinformation and provoca-
tions, copy-paste texts for further circulation, interpretative text 
messages, or compromising materials to smear their opponents), 
as well as instruments of direct influence such as leading articles 
by service chiefs, press and television interviews, information 
and photo services, and videos circulated in the media). The gov-
ernment can also use legal and organisational instruments, with 
which it can tighten control over the media and non-governmen-
tal organisations, and penalise all forms of criticism against the 
government.6 
The fight against the domestic opposition is a testing ground for 
new ways of predominating in information warfare. Alexei Nav-
alny, a lawyer, blogger and organiser of demonstrations promot-
ing democracy and the fight against corruption – and public enemy 
number one for the Russian elite – is a case in point. He published 
a story about abuse in the Russian Guard (Rosgvardiya) on the 
website of his Anti-Corruption Foundation;7 the report struck at 
the public image of the service, whose establishment in 2016 was 
supposed to put an end to abuses in the Interior Ministry. In some 
ways the government’s battle against Navalny has had unex-
pected consequences:8 the case revealed the behind-the-scenes 
6 See ‘Putin for the fourth time’, OSW Report, March 2018, pp. 53–56, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/report_putin-for-the-fourth_net.pdf
7 ‘Кто объедает Росгвардию’, https://fbk.info/blog/post/441/
8 The Russian Guard’s chief Viktor Zolotov recorded an appeal to Navalny 
calling on him to stop spreading lies and threatening to “make mincemeat” 
of him. The unexpectedly strong negative reaction from the media forced 
Zolotov to radically change his public relations tactic: in his next public ap-
pearance he emphasised that “his service was working with the counterin-
telligence, military prosecutors, the Accounting Chamber and the internal 
security service to investigate the corruption.” He admitted that corrup-
tion had indeed taken place and said, “We are fighting against it, revealing 
those people, firing them and taking them to court.” See ‘Золотов записал 
обращение к Навальному’, https://ria.ru/society/20180911/1528277795.
html; https://tass.ru/obschestvo/5691029
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
3/
20
19
15
business machinations and the methods employed to ‘economi-
cally reclaim’ Crimea, by showing how overpriced meat products 
were delivered to the Russian Guard by the Crimean-registered 
Friendship of the Peoples meat processing plant owned by Boris 
Kantemirov, a former chief of the Central Archive of the Interior 
Ministry Troops (a body which was transformed into the Russian 
Guard). On the other hand, however, it allowed the services to 
perfect their methods of influence: the Russian Guard learnt the 
lesson that one cannot carry out disinformation ‘against the cur-
rent’ because doing so triggers strong reactions from the ‘wrong’ 
people. 
The state’s attempts to break up opposition groups by reversing the 
vectors of their ‘counter-information’ rely on enforcing the dis-
tinction between friend and foe. The critics of authoritarian rule 
are presented as foreign agents inspired by other countries’ intel-
ligence services, and emotionally decried as ‘scum’ and ‘traitors to 
the homeland’ who lack patriotic feelings and are intent on mar-
ginalising Russia. Representation like this also consolidates the 
general sense of ‘defence awareness’, which explains all of Rus-
sia’s problems as the results of Western (and especially American) 
plotting, and the workings of an internal fifth column (according 
to a recent poll, this opinion is shared by 60% of respondents).9 
9 В. Дергачев, ‘Россияне стали лучше относиться к ВЧК и КГБ’, РБК, 
21 February 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/21/02/2018/5a8d59f49a794
71a70e186ba
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II. thE krEmlIn’s stratEgIc and tactIcal 
objEctIvEs
It is clear that the reports from the information-war frontline 
(which are dominated by propaganda, disinformation and other 
ways of distorting information) do not make the public any better 
informed about the services, their objectives or methods. That is 
because their purpose is to drown out the information coming from 
the broadly-defined ‘enemy’, and to protect strategic information 
(information about the special services is treated as a strategic re-
source in Russia). These information exercises are both defensive 
and offensive. The pro-Kremlin media emphasise the protective, 
defensive aspects of the services’ operations, while the enemy’s se-
cret services are accused of actions such as illegally obtaining in-
formation, manipulating perceptions, distorting the information 
space and other antagonistic measures. Such actions, oriented to-
wards obscuring the enemy’s message, do not accurately reflect the 
realities of the services, but they do actually shape the way the ser-
vices are perceived. Reports on popular online websites aggregat-
ing news stories from the Russian press that discredit the services, 
such as http://www.compromat.ru and http://www.rospress.ru 
should be taken with a large pinch of salt; the Russian opposition 
treats them as information sabotage, and has responded by creat-
ing its own website, http://anticompromat.org. The online world 
is competing with television as a mass medium, which forces the 
services to use digital multimedia technologies (videos in particu-
lar are very popular) and create attractive websites that resemble 
social media. One example is PASMI (Первое антикорупционное 
средство массовой информации, or the First Anti-Corruption Mass 
Medium), which publishes stories about corruption in the Moscow 
Internal Ministry Academy, 10 and which in this way channels and 
isolates genuine journalistic investigations.
10 For example, see ‘ФСБ перестала быть неприкасаемой’, https://pasmi.ru. 
Dmitri Verbitsky, the founder of this site, is a graduate of the Moscow Inter-
nal Ministry Academy, an accomplished social activist (a deputy chair of the 
anti-corruption group in the Russian Union of Journalists, and a member of 
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Stories about corruption among functionaries are usually pre-
sented in a ‘state-building’, didactic context. They are accompa-
nied by comments which emphasise the dramatic consequences 
of corruption as a malady that hampers reforms, causes substan-
tial losses to the state budget, demoralises the public, fosters turf 
wars, and even degrades spiritual values by promoting the vio-
lence and ideology of the criminal world. By shining light on the 
mechanisms of corruption, the outlets in question are supposed 
to demonstrate that Russia enjoys pluralism of opinion and social 
justice – and thus to score publicity points for the government. 
The widely reported stories that penal colonies for members of 
the security departments are becoming overcrowded are another 
part of this effort. In highlighting this problem, the deputy chief 
of the Federal Penitentiary announced that the growing number 
of convicted functionaries meant new specialised penal colonies 
had to be created11, or that existing ones had to be reclassified.12 
The publicity for this kind of social justice also includes stories 
about riots among functionaries serving time in penal colonies.13 
The statistics about corruption within the services which are 
quoted in such reports are fragmentary, and therefore mislead-
ing14; they cannot be said to reflect the real scale of crime among 
their personnel. Such reports, which augment the information-
al chaos by creating the impression of a war of ‘all against all’, 
the expert group for preventing corruption in the Presidential Administra-
tion and other bodies), and has received a number of awards from the Interior 
Ministry, including medals for ‘Best Functionary of the Criminal Police’ and 
‘10 Years of Flawless Service’.
11 В. Гордеев, ‘Замглавы ФСИН заявил о нехватке колоний для осу жден-
ных’, РБК, 13 November 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/society/13/11/2018/5beb
2b2d9a79479f9f0ea504
12 А. Раскин, ‘Мест всем хватит. Для осуждённых силовиков готовят но-
вые колонии’, Life.ru, 14 November 2018, https://life.ru/.../miest_vsiem_kh-
vatit_dlia_osuzhdionnykh_silovik...
13 ‘Осужденные силовики устроили бунт в колонии и потребовали про-
курора’, Lenta.ru, 21 August 2018, https://lenta.ru/news/2018/08/21/perm/
14 ‘Полиция и местные депутаты лидируют по числу фигурантов дел о кор-
рупции’, Интерфакс, 9 December 2018. 
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increased noticeably on the occasion of the budgetary debate in 
December, which coincided with International Anti-Corruption 
Day (9 December: in Russia such media campaigns are ‘attached’ 
to official celebrations, department holidays and other occasions, 
as well as to the adoption of new legal acts like presidential de-
cree no. 378, which approved the ‘Plan for fighting corruption in 
the years 2018–2020’). So it is possible that the penitentiary ser-
vice’s increased media activity was linked to its involvement in 
the Kremlin’s anti-corruption project. However, it could also have 
been explained equally logically as an effort to get more funding 
to implement another governmental programme, this time for 
the ‘Development of the Penitentiary System in the years 2018–
2026’,15 the preamble of which refers not so much to increased 
crime levels among functionaries as to the generally rising crime 
levels in Russia and the dramatic situation in prisons and penal 
colonies; there are estimates that the maximum limits of inmates 
has been exceeded by between 23 and 56%. 
The stories one hears about the so-called silovik wars – rivalries 
among the services of different ministries and the competitive 
struggles between different parts of the same service, usually 
the Federal Security Service (FSS) – actually serve to camouflage 
their real activities. Usually these reports are pretty much worth-
less, and are usually difficult to verify. For example, in 2018 Rus-
sian commentators devoted a great deal of attention to the sup-
posed rise of the Federal Protection Service (FPS), as ostensibly 
demonstrated by its newly expanded prerogatives. Indeed, under 
Putin’s decree of 27 February 2018, point 12 was added to the FPS’s 
bylaws concerning the government elite’s security, which read: 
“As part of its competences, the Service will take part in the im-
plementation of the international information security policy, 
undertakings of information warfare and activities aimed at de-
tecting, preventing and mitigating the effects of attacks on the 
15 Both bills can be accessed at http://pravo.garant.ru
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Russian Federation’s information resources.”16 Hitherto the media 
had only emphasised the FPS’s protective and auxiliary functions 
(such as monitoring public sentiment and conducting opinion 
polls commissioned by the Kremlin).
The line taken at that time was that the Federal Security Service’s 
position had been shaken, and that it had become paralysed with 
regard to information security. This was supposedly the conse-
quence of the weakening of the FSS’s Information Security Cen-
tre as a result of its struggles with military intelligence (the for-
mer GRU) and its twin structure within the FSS, the Centre for 
the Protection of Information and Special Communications. The 
former body, also known as military unit 64829, went through 
a personnel shock as two of its leaders, Sergei Mikhailov and 
Dmitri Dokuchev, were arrested on charges of high treason after 
they allegedly passed information to the CIA about 12 GRU hacker 
groups; also, two other officers faced criminal lawsuits after being 
charged with the embezzlement of state funds. In an atmosphere 
of scandal, the Centre’s long-time head Andrei Gerasimov was re-
portedly demoted to the reserves amidst a campaign discrediting 
him, his son and daughter, who owned IT companies involved in 
implementing state contracts. In this context, the attempt to ex-
pand the FPS’s competences could have been aimed at strengthen-
ing Russia’s offensive potential in cyberspace. However, the con-
clusions about the shakeup in the information security structures 
proved premature: Aleksandr Bortnikov’s order no. 366 of 24 July 
2018 establishing the National Co-ordination Centre for the Pre-
vention and Impact Mitigation of Computer Incidents17 re-assert-
ed the FSS’s key co-ordinating role in the system.
What this shows is that the political information war involves 
all the uniformed services: first and foremost, the security and 
protection services (the FSS, the FPS, the Federal Service of the 
16 https://rg.ru/2018/02/27/prezident-ukaz89-site-dok.html
17 https://rg.ru/2018/09/10/fsb-prikaz366-site-dok.html
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National Guard, the Russian Guard), as well as the intelligence 
services (the civilian Foreign Intelligence Service and the mili-
tary Main Directorate of the General Staff (formerly the GRU), and 
to an extent the FSS). These observations about the intelligence 
services18 apply equally to the entire security sector. The Krem-
lin’s projects push its constituent organisations to undertake both 
defensive (involving psy-ops, inciting and propaganda) and of-
fensive operations (breaking into foreign information resources, 
manipulating the enemy’s media and public opinion). As a result, 
there is no single image which unifies the special services. 
Their presence in the public sphere serves different purposes, and 
should thus be analysed in several different dimensions:
 – as support operations for the ruling elite (on the one hand, 
they give the impression that Russia has freedom of speech, 
social justice and is fighting corruption; but on the other, they 
justify the state’s restrictions on civil liberties);
 – as a way to manage public opinion, i.e. distracting public at-
tention from the problems which are most troublesome the 
people and which the opposition highlights, but the state can-
not solve;
 – as a safeguard for the nexus of politics, force and business that 
underlies Putin’s system of power; 
 – as self-promotion for the services (especially their counter-
intelligence, anti-terror and anti-extremist activities);
 – as distraction and camouflage, designed to divert attention 
from and mislead about the services’ operations; and
18 M. Galeotti, ‘Russian intelligence is at (political) war’, NATO Review, 12 May 
2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2019/Themes/EN/index.htm
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
3/
20
19
21
as a form of immunisation, i.e. a way to strengthen the security 
system’s resilience and cohesion (the information war involves 
a series of successes and failures for the services, but which re-
main hidden from the public eye).
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III. tradItIon and lEgacy
The Kremlin’s image policy, in which the services’ public percep-
tion is treated as part of the image of a strong state and strong 
government, is based on ensuring that uncontrolled information 
which depicts reality negatively does not overshadow the reality 
presented in the official declarations. This declared reality pushes 
the actual reality to the margins, making it irrelevant. As a result, 
any scandals unearthed which involve the special services do 
not affect their reputation or engender any crises of confidence. 
The picture of the special services portrayed in traditional and 
social media, official statements, documentaries and television 
series, meets the public’s expectations and reinforces the cult of 
the strong state19 and strong leadership. The public’s trust in the 
special services remains stable in opinion polls;20 with favourable 
ratings of 55.7%, the services rank as one of the top three most 
trusted institutions, after the army (84.8%) and the Orthodox 
Church (65.7%). The services are trusted even though the pub-
lic knows little about their work: in a survey conducted by FOM 
after the GRU’s latest series of blunders, 65% of respondents said 
that they did not know what the services’ foreign operations were 
about, but at the same time 45% said they had a positive opinion 
about those activities (10% had a negative opinion), and 26% be-
lieved that the quality of work of Russian foreign intelligence had 
improved considerably over the past decade.21
The security sector’s public image has been of special concern for 
the Kremlin since the times of Yuri Andropov. When he helmed 
the KGB, a massive propaganda campaign was initiated, involv-
ing literary and film competitions and even beauty contests; this 
19 Д. Федор, Традиции чекистов от Ленина до Путина. Культ государственной 
безопасности, СПб, 2012.
20 А. Ласнов, ‘Определен уровень доверия россиян к ВС и церкви’, Взгляд, 
12 October 2018, https://vz.ru/news/2018/10/12/945841.html
21 ‘65% граждан ничего не знают о работе российских служб за рубежом’, 
Regnum, 12 November 2018, https://regnum.ru/news/2517172.html
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effectively obliterated the image of the KGB as a political police and 
of its functionaries as oppressors which had become ingrained 
in public awareness during the Khrushchev thaw. The image of 
the executioner which had predominated during the rehabilita-
tion of the victims of Stalinist crimes was replaced by that of the 
legendary intelligence officer Stirlitz. The campaign itself, which 
emphasised the KGB’s intelligence activities, took place at an op-
portune moment, and helped to end the crisis of confidence in the 
state. A similar campaign accompanied the rise to power of the 
former KGB officer Vladimir Putin.
Nevertheless, since 2000 the provenance of the Russian ruling 
elite has continually raised questions about the special services’ 
role in Russia’s political, economic and social life. It has long been 
accepted in Russia that effective image management requires not 
only a long-term strategy, but also consistency in its implementa-
tion, as well as the involvement of the authorities. So the latter 
participate in shaping the public’s expectations regarding the ser-
vices, and in repairing their image following the crises caused by 
widely publicised scandals. 
President Putin has also played an important role in shaping and 
adjusting the special services’ image, as he demonstrated repeat-
edly in 2018 in connection with the GRU’s centenary celebrations. 
In early 2018 he praised the military intelligence for their ac-
tivities in Syria, saying they had contributed to Russia’s success 
there. Then he became personally involved in the campaign to 
whitewash the GRU operation in Salisbury: he said of the perpe-
trators: “We know who they are. They are civilians. There is noth-
ing criminal here,”22 and went on to characterise Sergei Skripal as 
‘lowlife’ and a ‘traitor’ around whom an entire information cam-
paign had been developed. Putin then said that all the rest was 
22 В. Рувинский, ‘Как Путин закрыл тему российского следа в Солсбери’, 
Ве до мости, 12 October 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/ 
2018/09/12/780732-kak
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just espionage which, “just like prostitution, is one of the world’s 
most important professions.”23 On 2 November, on the eve of the 
centenary celebrations, the president stated that he was “reas-
sured about the professionalism, courage and determination of 
the military intelligence officers,” and that – as commander-in-
chief of the Russian armed forces – he “knew the unique potential 
of the service and valued the information and intelligence coming 
from the General Staff”. He explained the problems plaguing the 
GRU as the result of “mounting conflicts in today’s world, which 
is witnessing provocations, blatant lies and attempts at distorting 
the strategic balance.” He also recalled the military intelligence 
of the Tsar’s army, “whose officers were aware that there was no 
greater shame than betraying their homeland and their com-
rades, and who helped preserve the continuity of the service and 
its tradition in times of revolutionary tumult.” 
The accusations against military intelligence were also dismissed 
as ‘crude provocations’ by the head of civilian intelligence, Sergei 
Naryshkin, who assured the viewers of the state-owned Chan-
nel 1 that the Russian intelligence triad (the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, military intelligence and the Federal Security Service) 
shared an understanding of their objectives and tasks. An order 
by defence minister Sergei Shoigu also emphasised the efficacy of 
“the current generation of military intelligence in Russia, which 
upholds the traditions of its predecessors with dignity. It suc-
cessfully accomplishes difficult and responsible tasks involved in 
defending the nation and the state”. Both opinions were repeat-
ed and amplified by the pro-Kremlin media, while the military 
commentator Viktor Baranets announced that the presidential 
proposal to restore the military intelligence’s former name of GRU 
had provoked a “standing ovation with the force of a nuclear ex-
plosion”.
23 ‘Путин о Скрипале: предатель и подонок’, Regnum, 3 October 2018, https://
regnum.ru/news/2493946.html
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Iv. PItfalls In IntErPrEtatIon
The image of a professional, effective force stands in sharp con-
trast to the image of the GRU as painted by the opposition media 
(Novaya Gazeta, Meduza) with mischievous satisfaction; they, 
on the contrary, emphasise the disgraceful scale of the services’ 
amateurishness. But neither the official nor the common image 
really reflects the truth. The former approach emphasises the ser-
vices’ statutory tasks and is painted in bright colours, while the 
latter highlights their extrajudicial, illegal activities. Both sides 
have accumulated their distinctive myths; both use distinctive 
narrative styles (official pathos versus emotionally-charged nega-
tive characteristics), and both have separate underlying theories 
about the special services’ role in the Russian system of govern-
ment (‘Chekistocracy’ and praetorianism versus kleptocracy and 
‘corpocratism’). While the official image represents the services 
as guardians of the state and its stability, the common image em-
phasises a pliancy or even servility towards the political decision-
makers which trumps adherence to the law, as well as the way in 
which the special services have become instrumentalised in or-
der to use brutality on the government’s opponents.
Table 1. Characteristic features of the Russian special services 
in their official and common images
official image common image
High professionalism Poor training, amateurishness, disregard for the rules of secrecy
Flawless, impeccable elite Crime-ridden abusers of power for their own benefit
Patriotism and national pride Lack of discipline and indiscretion
Pillars of order and stability 
in Russia Servility and brutal methods
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official image common image
Bulwark of traditional values Corruptibility and demoralisation
Defenders of homeland Defenders of their particular cor-porate interest
Community of values Rivalry and conflicts
The prevalence of conspiracy theories and the inability to verify 
intuitive hypotheses often lead their authors to rash conclusions 
(for example, that GRU officers are poorly trained, or that the ser-
vice’s organisational and personnel stability have been shaken 
by minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s reforms), or to cookie-cutter 
models of interpretation such as the ‘war among the siloviki’ men-
tioned above. The common image questions the services’ loyalty to 
the Kremlin, emphasises their unaccountability, and highlights 
their conflict and criminal potential. However, it is quite easy to 
undermine these proposed interpretations. The ‘wars’ allegedly 
waged between the FSS and GRU via the Fancy Bear and Shaltai 
Boltai hacker groups do not explain how, for instance, the GRU be-
came implicated in the ‘doping war’ (computers owned by the GRU 
officers Alexei Morents and Yevgeni Serebryakov were seized by 
the Dutch services and found to contain evidence of a hack into 
the network of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA); however, 
the doping scandal mainly served to discredit the FSS, which was 
shown to have been involved in falsifying doping tests during the 
Olympic Games in 2008, 2012 and 2014). 
The claims of disloyalty among functionaries seem implausible 
when we consider that the services are treated as a recruitment 
pool for the administration, providing a reservoir of loyal people 
appointed to key positions who lack their own political following 
and are entirely dependent on the presidential centre of power. 
The claims of their political independence, on the other hand, 
do not stand the test of political practice: it is the President who 
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founds and disbands the services and appoints and dismisses 
their top leaders, which constitutes an effective legal safeguard 
preventing the services from gaining political independence. 
Moreover, the concentration of power and resources in the hands 
of a ruling elite which hails from the special services does not pro-
voke any hostility among ordinary functionaries or generational 
conflicts within the services. 
The factors restraining any potential discontent include the fol-
lowing: 
 – the salaries of functionaries have been rising regularly and 
their working conditions have been improving (this also ap-
plies to retired functionaries of the uniformed services);24
 – it is relatively easy for a functionary to obtain authorisation to 
engage in gainful activity outside the service (e.g. in the large 
private security sector); 
 – selective ‘disciplinary’ measures are applied for show against 
senior officers (accompanying the natural generational change 
in the leadership of the services);
 – the corporate mentality emphasises hierarchies, loyalty and 
commitment, combined with the conviction that the services 
stand above the rest of society.
However, in some cases the opposition media have hit the bullseye. 
The fellowship within the ranks of the broadly understood ‘Chek-
ist’ and siloviki corporations was confirmed by reports about the 
so-called ‘Sechin spetsnaz’, i.e. the structures ensuring the FSB’s 
economic security which control business magnates and protect 
24 In 2019, pensions for retired members of the uniformed services will rise 
by 6.3%. See ‘Путин: рост военных пенсий превысит 6% в 2019 году’, RT, 
25 October 2018, https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/567437-putin-rost-
voennyh-pensii
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the interests and influence of state oligarchs like Rosneft’s chair-
man Igor Sechin. In this context, it also seems logical to assume 
that the FSS is performing a non-statutory function as a market 
regulator by carrying out show detentions, employing so-called 
krishevanie (protectionism), and seizing property by force. 
However, these seemingly logical reports (e.g. about the rivalry 
among the services, which is seen as a kind of competition among 
‘companies of the same sector’) are one-sided and therefore ten-
dentious. But the Kremlin tolerates them, as they contribute to the 
information overload. Novaya Gazeta obtained some interesting 
statistics in this context when it analysed media reports about anti-
terror activities, the topic around which many services, including 
the FSS, the Interior Ministry, the National Anti-Terror Committee, 
and the Security Council of the Russian Federation, organise their 
self-promotion. Those services have different outreach potentials 
in the media (measured in terms of the number of identical stories 
published). What is notable is the conclusion: even though success 
has so many fathers, the actual outcomes of these anti-terror activi-
ties are rather modest. However, they miss the important fact that 
this strategic dimension is an important platform for co-ordinated 
activity among all the services, to enhance the flow of information 
between them, and for joint exercises. 
Table 2. Reports about anti-terror activities (between November 
2015 and November 2017) 
media reports fss Interior ministry
national 
anti-terror 
committee
security 
council
Number of official 
communiqués 3505 1702 492 236
Number of 
identical stories 18,560 3571 852 1122
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media reports fss Interior ministry
national 
anti-terror 
committee
security 
council
Information about 
results
13 convictions, 
14 detentions
3 convic-
tions, 
2 deten-
tions
No data No data
Source: https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/04/27/76328
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v. trEnds for 2019 (cIrcumstancEs, 
PrIorItIEs and guIdIng IdEologIEs)
It is an open secret that Russia’s special services are in a systemic 
dead-end. The political transformation which put the KGB at the 
helm of the political process has also secured a high institutional 
position for its successors. At the same time, however, it has built 
a number of problematic mechanisms into the Russian security 
system, including: 
 – absence of limitations (a sense of impunity and relative free-
dom to undertake non-statutory activities), which encourages 
aggressive risk-taking; 
 – no public supervision of the security sector (the presi-
dent’s supervision, or the lack thereof, means the services are 
shielded from accountability);
 – legal nihilism: this applies to small machinations by func-
tionaries (such as paying bribes to obtain licences), as well 
as greater scandals, e.g. involving how functionaries acquire 
their property; 
 – absence of a clear division of functions, activities and 
tasks (intelligence and counter-intelligence, control, security: 
for instance, the FSS combines the functions of a political po-
lice and an intelligence agency, while the Federal Protective 
Service takes part in information warfare); 
 – clashes between different ministries’ services stemming 
from the conflict-generating overlaps in their competences, an 
idea which was originally intended to stimulate competition;
 – abuse of the right to classify information (the business com-
munity rooted in the former KGB also has the right to classify in-
formation about itself. Because of the privilege of secrecy and the 
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mutual support between the state and siloviki business, it should 
be seen as internal to the system, occupying a special place with-
in it, rather than merely being part of its surroundings); 
 – conflicts of public and private interests stemming from 
corporate solidarity with the so-called siloviki oligarchy (the 
business backing of Putin’s rule, which has been described as 
‘Russian crony capitalism’);
 – systemic corruption as a multi-purpose instrument for do-
ing business, blackmail, disciplining the elites, bribing politi-
cal opponents, etc.). 
These systemic, long-lasting features affect the daily work of the 
Russian special services and their media image, both when tar-
geting the regime’s internal opponents and the ‘enemy’ more 
broadly understood. The current ideology justifying the Kremlin’s 
confrontational strategy and its militarist turn is not expected to 
change radically. 
However, there are also some new factors: 
 – the West’s determination to counter Russia’s external infor-
mation warfare and reveal its sabotage tactics (more than 
thirty states imposed sanctions on Russia following the Skri-
pals’ poisoning in solidarity with Great Britain); 
 – the growing resolve in NATO states to prevent Russia’s aggres-
sive operations from escalating;
 – awareness of the antagonistic relations between the EU and 
Russia over the Eastern neighbourhood, which brings the 
threats Russia poses into relief;
 – the events which have demonstrated the potential for using 
the internet and the power of making information openly 
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available (the GRU’s Dutch failure, and the expulsion on 13 April 
of four officers detained in connection with the attempted cy-
ber-attack on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons; these events triggered a wave of journalistic inves-
tigations which produced photos of the functiona ries, their 
travel routes, real identities and cover documents, home ad-
dresses etc., which effectively neutralised Russian attempts to 
spread disinformation about ‘Western provocations’ against 
the GRU). 
In recent years, Russia’s special services have stepped up their op-
erations in cyberspace, which offers instruments for activities ca-
pable of affecting the global situation. The challenges coming from 
this area will remain crucial in Russia’s relations with its nearer 
and further neighbourhoods.25
Technological progress has accelerated the circulation of infor-
mation, made access easier and opened up broad possibilities 
to manage information. However, it has also made information 
a double-sided sword – what used to be secret is now quickly re-
vealed, which effectively undermines Russian disinformation ef-
forts. Thus, Russia will seek to deploy a full range of information 
warfare forces and means (both defensive and offensive26), involv-
ing both existing and new entities. It has the necessary traditions 
and experience, and the well-trained human resources.
Contrary to media speculation about ‘wars’ between the services 
of different ministries, efforts to consolidate the potential of the 
different special services – i.e. ensuring that they work together 
25 The United States’ reaction has been noteworthy in this context: in 2019 the 
Congress plans to consider a new bill entitled ‘The Defending American Se-
curity from Kremlin Aggression Act’.
26 See P. Żochowski, ‘Rosyjskie służby specjalne – ofensywność za wszelką cenę’ 
[Russia’s special services – offensive at all costs], Teologia Polityczna, 22 Oc-
tober 2018, https://teologiapolityczna.pl/piotr-zochowski-rosyjskie-sluzby-
specjalne-ofensywnosc-za-wszelka-cene-1
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in a co-ordinated manner in strategic areas such as information 
warfare or anti-terror activities, and in carrying out the Kremlin’s 
strategic political projects – have been observed for years. In the 
context of those shared objectives and tasks, it seems that there 
is not so much a rivalry between individual services, but rather 
a competition between methods, ways of influence, and resources 
(human and other). This much is clear from the presidential de-
cree of 3 September 201827 which extended the rules for state se-
crecy to information concerning persons involved in intelligence 
activities who are not intelligence staff members of the Ministry 
of Defence, the Foreign Intelligence Service or the Federal Secu-
rity Service. The decree does not cover people who had previously 
co-operated with the intelligence services and were covered by 
secrecy provisions; rather, apparently, it covers external actors to 
whom more tasks will be outsourced. 
In the foreseeable future we should also expect to see further ef-
forts aimed at restoring balance in the aftermath of the series of 
the Russian military intelligence’s blunders. The emphasis will 
presumably be on ensuring the internal cohesion of the Russian 
security and defence sectors and the siloviki elite (the ‘Russian 
force community’ or ‘community of successes’, as success is Rus-
sia’s main propaganda brand). This is especially true since the 
historical memory of the fall of two empires (Tsarist Russia and 
the Soviet Union) is still alive in Russia, along with the awareness 
that authoritarian regimes do not collapse as a result of social pro-
tests or leaders losing popularity – they collapse when the ruling 
elites lose their internal cohesion.
27 ‘О внесении изменений в перечень сведений, отнесенных к госу-
дарственной тайне’, http://prezident.org/articles/ukaz-prezidenta-rf-
506-ot-3-sentjabrja-2018-goda-03-09-2018.html
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conclusIon
The events of the past year, and especially the Skripal poisoning, 
have brought the Russian special services back into current de-
bate, defining the main threads of international debates about 
them. Those debates had been going on before, but the Skripals’ 
case, unlike the similar Litvinenko case of 2006, has definitely 
sharpened their tone. It also brought about a qualitative change in 
political practice by triggering a consolidated reaction from West-
ern states and international organisations, which included diplo-
matic measures (jointly agreed official statements, synchronised 
expulsions of ‘diplomats’ suspected of dual activities), as well as 
new political and economic sanctions against Russia.
In the West, the Skripals’ case also reinforced the Russian spe-
cial services’ negative image, employing illegal means (blackmail, 
bribery, secret killings), techniques of disinformation and incite-
ment also known as ‘active measures’ which serve to deepen ten-
sions, creating divisions and strengthening destructive social be-
haviours in other countries in order to destabilise them. Analyses 
and opinions on this subject commonly refer to the KGB’s methods 
from the Cold War era of information and psychological warfare 
in 1946–1991, which crystallised the political divisions between 
East and West. 
In reality, the Cold War experience is only part of Russia’s disin-
formation legacy. “The art of lying is as old as Russia”, wrote the 
philosopher and Russia scholar Alain Besançon in his essay Holy 
Russia, arguing that disinformation was a fundamental feature 
of the nation.28 When used as a weapon in the struggle against 
the West, it has proven so effective that the Russians clearly can-
not extricate themselves from their centuries-old addiction to it. 
This is because, by creating deep divisions around the world, it 
makes it possible to focus other states’ attention on the Kremlin’s 
28 A. Besançon, Święta Ruś [Holy Russia], Warszawa 2012, p. 11.
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imperial policy. It is for this reason that blackmail and military 
threats have been a permanent part of the Kremlin’s narrative: 
Tsar Alexander announced to the world that “Russia had only two 
allies: the army and the navy”, Nikita Khrushchev boasted his 
country was “producing rockets like sausages”, and Vladimir Pu-
tin has threatened to enter a new arms race and produce a weapon 
that would “overcome all existing and prospective anti-aircraft 
and anti-missile defence systems”. This leads to the conclusion 
that Russia is being pushed to continue and enhance its methods 
of manipulation and disinformation by the very nature of the au-
thoritarian Russian state.
These constant, systemic circumstances and the West’s aforemen-
tioned mobilisation against the Kremlin’s aggressive policies also 
warrant the conclusion that the Russian special services cannot 
successfully do anything in the West that could help the Kremlin’s 
elite to resolve its fundamental problem concerning the image of 
Russia and its ruling elite in the eyes of foreign public opinion. 
But that does not mean they will stop undertaking activities in 
the information space (including cyberspace), which may offer 
the Kremlin convenient tools to influence the global situation. On 
the contrary, after the GRU’s failures in 2018, Russia will aim to 
deploy a full range of information-war forces and measures (both 
defensive and offensive), involving existing and new actors, and 
to consolidate and co-ordinate the services’ potential. It has the 
necessary traditions, legacy and well-trained people. It should be 
noted that domestically, the damage to the Russian services’ im-
age was minimal; that should be interpreted as proof of how effec-
tive have been the efforts to obscure the actual reality by focusing 
attention on the defence against information-war provocations by 
Western services. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting once again that the Russian spe-
cial services’ model of operation is primarily a product of Russian 
authoritarianism; on the one hand, this is founded on a confron-
tational, anti-Western strategy, and on the other, it is focused on 
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domestic challenges (represented as the defence of the ‘besieged 
fortress’ that is Russia against all sorts of spies, saboteurs, foreign 
agents, terrorists and extremists). And since there is no indica-
tion29 that the Russian authoritarian system might collapse in the 
foreseeable future, the Russian institutions of force will continue 
to be its beneficiaries: in the context of Russia’s information wars, 
the significance of their secret operations is difficult to overesti-
mate. This means that the challenge they pose will remain crucial 
for international relations and global security.
JOLANTA DARCZEWSKA
29 See ‘Putin for the fourth time’, OSW Report, March 2018, op. cit., https://www.
osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/report_putin-for-the-fourth_net.pdf
